Download Being qua being: a theory of identity, existence, and by Panayot Butchvarov PDF

By Panayot Butchvarov

Are there nonexistent issues? what's the nature of informative identification statements? Are the notions of crucial estate and of essence intelligible, and, if that is so, how are they to be understood? Are person issues fabric elements or clusters of features? Can the account of the solidarity of a fancy entity keep away from vicious endless regresses? those questions have attracted common consciousness between philosophers lately, as evidenced by means of a proliferation of articles within the top philosophical journals. In Being Qua Being they obtain systematic, unified remedy, grounded in an account of the character of the appliance to the realm of our conceptual equipment. A valuable thesis of the e-book is that the subject of id is basic, and that life and predication, either crucial and unintentional, are to be understood when it comes to identification.

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Extra info for Being qua being: a theory of identity, existence, and predication

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F. Stout, The Nature of Universals and Propositions (London: Oxford University Press, 1921, British Academy Annual Philosophical Lecture). I dis- ( footnote continued on next page) Page 27 nying the law of identity. Moreover, I could, though not very lucidly, express the fact that the color of this page (sense-datum) is the same as the color of that page (sense-datum) simply by saying "This is the same (color) as that," referring with "this" to the color of the one page (sense-datum) and with "that" to the color of the other page (sense-datum).

That the Morning Star is the same as the Morning Star is not a matter of discovery at all. , "18 + 13 = 31") are not a posteriori and, in one sense of this vague word, also not informative. And if logical truths have an ontological ground, then, in another sense, even formal identity statements could be said to be informative. It has also been supposed that, unlike formal identity statements, material identity statements are often contingent. While the Morning Star could not have failed to be the same as the Morning Star, it could have failed to be the same as the Evening Star.

Page 17 Why is there such a striking difference between material identity statements and formal identity statements? It might be thought that the reason is that, unlike the former, the latter are self-evident or trivial. But to speak of the self-evidence or triviality (and not merely necessary truth, like that of "18 + 13 =31") of an identity statement is at best an obscure and epistemologically tendentious way of speaking of the fact that what the statement is about does not even appear to he two distinct things.

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